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2Abstract
Nitrogen emissions from agriculture are considered an important environmental problem in
Denmark motivating consideration of different tax schemes as regulatory instruments. In this
paper, input/output behaviour of Danish pig farmers is estimated with farm level panel data
using the dual profit function approach, and emission functions for nitrogen loss are derived.
With the estimated model we are able to compare cost-effectiveness of a comprehensive
Pigouvian tax on nitrogen loss with simpler tax schemes that focus on nitrogen use. We find
that both a fertilizer tax and a feed tax generate substantially higher abatement costs than
Pigouvian incentives. A tax on nitrogen in all inputs will, on the other hand, only generate a
marginal increase in abatement costs.
These results are of interest because a tax on all nitrogen inputs is easier to
implement than a comprehensive nitrogen loss tax. Our result implies that even a limited
administrative cost advantage may make the input tax preferable to implementing Pigouvian
incentives through an nitrogen loss tax.
31. Introduction
Nitrogen emissions from agriculture are considered an important environmental problem in
Denmark and substantial reductions in nitrogen loss have been called for. Reduction goals
have so far not been met and incentive schemes are being considered as an alternative to the
existing command and control regulation in order to increase regulatory cost-effectiveness.
A tax on nitrogen fertilizer has been on the political agenda for several years and
recently a tax on nitrogen loss has been suggested in different variants by e.g. Huang and
LeBlanc (1994), Fontein et al. (1994) and  Hansen (1999). If nitrogen loss is accepted as an
indicator of the environmental effect then taxing nitrogen loss corresponds to a Pigouvian
externality tax and will therefore minimise abatement costs. However, the administrative
costs of taxing nitrogen loss may be substantially higher than the administrative costs of
taxing nitrogen fertilizer inputs. It is therefore important to evaluate the magnitude of the
abatement cost advantage of the nitrogen loss tax relative to simpler tax schemes. If the
abatement cost advantage is small, simpler tax systems may be preferable when
administrative costs are taken into account.
         In this paper, input demand and output supply behaviour of Danish pig farmers is
estimated with farm level panel data using the dual profit function approach. Our panel allows
estimation with a number of farm-specific effects and we exploit estimation of the
unrestricted profit function to derive long-run effects. The data  also allow calculation of 
farm level nitrogen loss so that it becomes possible to quantify (an indicator of) the
environmental effect of different tax policies as well as their abatement costs, i.e. allowing us
to compare cost-effectiveness.  
Although the analysis only covers part of the Danish agricultural sector, pig
production is a major contributor to Danish agriculture's nitrogen loss as well as being an
economically important agricultural sub-sector (see footnotes 1 and 2 for references). Since
nitrogen loss from pig production is also considered an important environmental problem in a
number of other European countries and some US states, results regarding regulatory
efficiency within the Danish pig sector may be of more general interest.
Our analysis may also be of methodological interest since we utilize the emission
function approach instead of the standard externality model used in other comparable studies
(to our knowledge the only other micro econometric study of nitrogen emission from pig
production is Fontein et al. (1994)). The emission function approach solves a consistency
problem that arises when the standard approach is applied to nitrogen loss from Pig
production. The consistency problem pointed out here is, however, not specific to this
emission problem and the emission function approach may therefore be preferred  for analysis
of a wider class of emissions. 
In the next section Danish pig farming is described. In section three, we demonstrate
the consistency problem of the standard externality model and develop an alternative
approach. After a data description in section four, model estimation and control is  presented
in section five. Section six summarises the results, and conclusions are drawn in section
seven.      
2. Danish Pig Production, Nitrogen Emissions and Regulation
Denmark is, along with the Netherlands and the US, one of the world's major pork meat
exporters and the total number of pigs delivered to slaughterhouses was close to 22 million in
1999 - a number that has been steadily rising over the last decade. Pig farms account for about
1 See Danmarks Statistik (1999a and 1999b).
2 See e.g. Skop and Schou (1996) and Andersen et al. (forthcoming).
3 Nitrogen fixating leguminous crops are not an important part of the Danish pig
farm crop mix and are ignored in the figure.
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40% of total agricultural income on full time farms1. In addition, a comparable proportion of
total agricultural nitrogen loss in Denmark is attributed to pig production making it a key sub-
sector in this regard as well2. Nitrogen flows, through a typical Danish pig farm are illustrated
in figure 1.
Figure. 1. Illustration of nitrogen flow on a typical pig farm3 
Note: N=Nitrogen
 
Nitrogen is imported to the farm in feed and fertilizer and exported as part of pig and crop
output. Finally, nitrogen is lost through the production process. A substantial part of nitrogen
emissions from pig farms originates from the production of pig manure. Part of the nitrogen
content of manure is lost in stalls and during storage through ammonium evaporation. When
the remaining manure bound nitrogen is utilized in plant production, the utilisation level is
substantially lower than the utilisation level for chemical fertilizer. Surplus nitrogen in
manure (i.e. the part of the nitrogen content that is not ultimately incorporated into crops) is
washed out as nitrate or denitrified along with surplus nitrogen from chemical fertilizer. Thus,
when disregarding changes in nitrogen stocks, (i.e. nitrogen bound in organic form in humus,
4Eutrofication is a process where algie growth spurred by excess nutrient loading
causes oxygen depletion and death/migration of higher level life forms. 
5For a detailed presentation of nitrogen loss from Danish agriculture, its
environmental effects and use of the nitrogen loss indicator as a proxy for environmental
effects see e.g. Hansen (1999). 
6Here, and in the following, we use the term Pigouvian to indicate that the structure
of this tax system allows/is consistent with implementation of welfare maximizing Pigouvian
incentives.  By itself,  the tax system only ensures that the abatement cost of reaching any
given reduction goal is minimized. Attainment of Pareto optimum also requires that the
emission reduction goal in the national action plan be set at the welfare maximising level.
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weeds, cover crops etc.), nitrogen loss is equal to nitrogen imported in fertilizer and feed less
nitrogen exported in products.  
Nitrogen emissions are widespread in Denmark, (where almost two thirds of the total
land area is cultivated), and have given rise to local groundwater contamination and regional
eutrofication4 of coastal sea areas, (effects primarily originating from nitrate leaching and
ammonium evaporation), in addition to global warming affects attributed to denitrified di-
nitrogen-oxide. The intensity of emissions and the regional/global nature of some of the
environmental effects have motivated the Danish Parliament to set national goals for
reduction of aggregate nitrogen emissions that supplement local statutes addressing local
contamination problems. 
Although nitrogen loss is not a good indicator of the total environmental effect of
emissions, (known to vary from locality to locality and across emitted compound types), it
may be a usable indicator of the baseline local and regional/global effects targeted in national
environmental action plans and we will use this indicator in the following5. 
Since the end of the 1980s a national goal for reducing aggregate nitrogen emissions
has been part of the Danish environmental action plan and all Danish farmers have been
subject to national regulations that have restricted when and how manure can be applied to
fields, required minimum manure storage capacity and winter plant cover etc. As mentioned,
the reductions called for in the action plans have not been reached and incentive regulation is
being considered as a way of meeting the planned emission reductions at lower costs. 
A tax on nitrogen in chemical fertilizer is one possibility being considered. This tax
is easy to implement and control (only requiring implementation and control at the level of
wholesale fertilizer suppliers). However, when considering figure 1 it is clear that such a tax
does not target nitrogen loss directly, and that perfect correlation between fertilizer use and
nitrogen loss cannot be expected to hold (e.g. a fertilizer tax gives farmers an incentive to
reduce fertilizer consumption by increasing manure nitrogen application/feed imports which
ceteris paribus increases nitrogen loss). 
Recently, a tax on nitrogen loss has been proposed. Clearly such a tax corresponds to
a Pigouvian externality tax if, as we have assumed, nitrogen loss is an acceptable measure of
the targeted environmental effect of nitrogen emissions6. By utilising the mass balance
condition, (nitrogen loss = nitrogen imported in inputs - nitrogen exported through outputs),
the tax can be implemented by requiring farmers to keep an account of nitrogen in farm
7Recently, the Netherlands has implemented a farm level tax on nitrogen loss based
on a farm level nutrient accounting system (MINAS).
8 See e.g. Hansen (1999) for details.
9 Other related studies include Poit-Lepetit and Vermersch (1998) where the non-
parametric  distance function approach is used on micro data from French pig farms and
several econometric studies of aggregated time series data e.g. Hallam and Zanoli (1993) and 
Kuiper and Meulenberg (1997). 
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imports and exports, thus allowing nitrogen loss to be calculated residually7. This would,
however, necessitate costly inspection and control of nitrogen accounts at the farm level. It
may be possible to implement such a tax through a nitrogen deposit refund system, whereby
farm level inspection can be avoided8. But a deposit-refund system would still require a
complex system of taxes and refunds at the level of wholesale suppliers, dairies,
slaughterhouses etc. involving substantially higher administrative costs than, for example, a
simple fertilizer tax.  
In conclusion it is not clear that implementation of Pigouvian incentives will be the
most efficient tax alternative when administrative costs are taken into account. An efficiency
ranking requires quantification of administrative costs as well as abatement costs. In the
following, we quantify abatement costs of the Pigouvian tax on nitrogen loss and three
simpler alternatives (a feed tax,  a fertilizer tax, and a tax on nitrogen in all inputs) for the key
agricultural sub-sector of pig production. 
3. Modelling Pig Farm Production and Nitrogen Loss
We are aware of one published microeconometric study of nitrogen loss from pig production
(Fontein et al., 1994)9. In this paper the authors follow the standard externality specification
(see e.g. Baumol and Oates, 1988) and model nitrogen loss as a production input. Since
nitrogen loss is not observed directly it calculated from observed input and output flows using
the mass balance condition. However, this approach implies a consistency problem since the
π'π(px,n,z,θ)
x' dπ
dpx
(px,n,z,θ)
10  In Fontein et al.(1994) a multi-input multi-output production function f(x,n,z) is
assumed where x is a vector of variable inputs (negatively signed) and outputs (positively
signed), n is nitrogen loss and z is a vector of fixed inputs. Fontein et al. assume that nitrogen
loss is fixed in the short run and specify the dual profit function π(px,n,z,θ) where px is the
vector of variable input/output prices and θ is a vector of parameters. Parameters are
estimated using the system of derived short run demand and supply equations:
Nitrogen loss cannot be observed, but must be calculated utilising the mass balance condition
n = -αx where α is a vector indicating unit nitrogen content of outputs and inputs. The shadow
value of increasing nitrogen loss  is derived as   where is the vector ofpˆn pˆn '
dπ
dn
(px,n,z,θˆ) θˆ
estimated parameters. The model implies that a tax ( tn ) on nitrogen loss has no effect in the
short run but has a long run effect that is calculated assuming that farmers adjust n (holding z
constant) so that  is satisfied (with corresponding long-run adjustmentspˆn%tn '
dπ
dn
(px,n,z,θˆ)
in x).
11 This issue is not peculiar to the modelling of pig production.  There is a potential
consistency problem whenever the standard externality model (combined with the usual
functional forms) is applied to an emissions that is known to satisfy the mass balance
condition (or in fact any known functional relationship with production inputs/outputs). 
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assumed production function does not satisfy the mass balance condition10. This is clearly so
in the short run where inputs and outputs may vary while nitrogen loss is constant. When the
usual flexible functional forms are used (e.g. quadratic, trans-log, generalized Liontief) the
mass balance condition will not be satisfied in the long run either.11. 
The emission function approach 
To overcome these problems, this paper uses the emission function approach (see
e.g. Holtermann, 1976 for an early presentation and e.g. Weaver et al. (1996) for a more
recent application). In this modelling approach, the production function is specified
independently of nitrogen loss i.e.  f(x,z) where x is a vector of variable inputs (negatively
signed) and outputs (positively signed) and z is a vector of fixed inputs. This is supplemented
with an emission function n = g(x,z) where n is nitrogen loss. Emissions are not a production
input nor do they enter into the firms' maximisation problem (in the pre-regulation state).
Instead emissions are derived ex post the production decision as a function of firm decision
variables. Specification of the emission function is given by the mass balance condition so
that we have n = g(x,z) = -αx where α is a vector indicating unit nitrogen content of outputs
and inputs. 
This approach ensures mass balance consistency and avoids the somewhat awkward
assumption that nitrogen loss is constant in the short run. Again, letting  θ be a vector of
parameters, denote π(px,z,θ) as the dual profit function associated with f(x,z) so that the system
12 This notation implies that an input tax has a positively signed tax rate (raising the
input price) while an output tax has a negatively signed tax rate (lowering the output price).
For subsidies the reverse sign rule applies.   
13 This is easily verified: total tax payed by the farmer is  which by (3)&txx
is  and by (2) is equal to  (see Holtermann, 1976 for a general presentation&αtnx ' tn(&αx) tnn
of Pigouvian incentives through indirect taxation). 
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π'π(px,z,θ)
x' dπ
dpx
(px,z,θ) (1)
n ' &αx. (2)
tx ' αtn (3)
Π ' π&pz z (4)
of derived short run demand and supply functions to be estimated becomes:
while nitrogen loss is given by the emission function:
Any tax system based on inputs and outputs can be characterised by the vector of
changes in the prices farmers face. Denoting this vector as tx , the input demand and output
supply induced in the short run are found by inserting the new price vector px + tx into the
estimated system (1) keeping fixed inputs constant12.
 The effects of taxes on inputs and outputs in the x vector can be calculated directly
from (1), but since nitrogen loss is not modelled as an input, the effects of a tax (tn) on
nitrogen loss are simulated by the following tax system:
i.e. all input and output prices are raised in proportion to their nitrogen content (i.e. inputs are
taxed and outputs subsidised in proportion to their nitrogen content). By the mass balance
condition/emission function this is equivalent to a tax of tn on nitrogen loss13.
Short and long run cost effectiveness
We derive short run effects as well as long run reactions where fixed inputs are allowed to
adjust. Noting that π is a gross margin from which the cost of fixed inputs must be deducted
to find the farmers' profit (denoted  Π ) we have:
where pz is a vector of fixed input prices. 
The short run abatement costs induced by a tax system tx  are, by definition, equal to
the induced profit loss less net tax payment. Letting superscript 0 indicate the base period and
superscript 1 the period just after implementation of any given tax vector tx , the abatement
9∆C sr ' Π1 & Π0 &txx ' π(p
0
x%tx,z 0,θˆ) & π(p
0
x ,z 0,θˆ) &txx (5)
∆n sr'n 1 & n 0'(&αx 1) & (&αx 0) ' &α dπ
dpx
(p 0x%tx,z 0,θˆ) &
dπ
dpx
(p 0x ,z 0,θˆ) (6)
pˆ 0z '
dπ
dz
(p 0x ,z 0,θˆ) (7)
Π(px,z,θˆ) ' π(px,z,θˆ)&pˆ
0
z z (8)
pˆ 0z '
dπ
dz
(p 0x%tx,z,θˆ) (9)
∆C lr ' Π2 & Π0 &txx ' π(p
0
x%tx,z 2,θˆ) & π(p
0
x ,z 0,θˆ) & pˆ 0z (z 2 & z 0) & txx (10)
∆n lr'n 2 & n 0'(&αx 2) & (&αx 0) ' &α dπ
dpx
(p 0x%tx,z 2,θˆ) &
dπ
dpx
(p 0x ,z 0,θˆ) (11)
costs (denoted ∆Csr ) generated in the short run become:
 
and by (2) and (3), the corresponding short run change in nitrogen emissions is
 
Even when the vector of fixed input prices pz is not observed, long-run effects of a
tax system can be calculated if the profit function is fully estimated. The shadow values of
fixed inputs   , for the chosen base period, can be derived from the estimated  profitpˆz
function  as
Assuming that farmers are in long-run equilibrium in the base year, the derived shadow price
will be equal to the marginal cost of acquiring an additional unit of the given fixed input so
that   . This allows full specification of the farmers' profit function i.e.:pz ' pˆ
0
z
 
giving the following first order conditions for optimal fixed input allocation under the tax
system tx:
Let z2 denote the solution to (9) and superscript 2  indicate a period after long-run adjustment
of the fixed inputs.
The long run abatement costs then become:
where the change in fixed costs is added to the long run effect on the gross margin to find the
long-run change in profits. The corresponding long-run change in nitrogen loss is:
As already noted, only when farmers are in long run equilibrium in the estimation period will
the estimated marginal profit effect of fixed inputs equal the fixed input cost. If the true price
is lower/higher than  use of this proxy will lead to over/underestimation of long runpˆ 0z
marginal abatement costs. However, relative cost evaluations (that are the focus of the current
paper) will be less sensitive to deviations from the assumption, since cost evaluations of
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different regulatory schemes are always biased in the same direction.   
Specification of the production function
Since the focus here is nitrogen loss, it is crucial that the estimated model describes  
supply and demand behaviour for inputs and outputs that are important for nitrogen flow,
while at the same time keeping the model reasonably simple. The production function
assumed here for each of the two groups of farms has two outputs: Pigs (x1) i.e
piglets/fattening pigs and crops (x2), two inputs: feed (x3) and nitrogen fertilizer (x4) and two
fixed intermediate inputs: cultivated land (z5) and pig stall capacity (z6) i.e. sow sties/fattening
pigsties. The production of intermediate fixed input is specified as follows: 
z5 = z5(capital, labour, materials, land)
z6 = z6(capital, labour, materials)
so that the specified primary inputs can be dropped from the model if intermediate inputs are
observed in the data. 
We assume that cultivated land is produced using land, tractor and harvesting
equipment, fuel and labour as inputs (i.e. the cost of cultivating a hectare of land is assumed
independent of the amount of fertilizer applied and the crop yield harvested). The remaining
non-nutrient cropping input (drying costs, sowing seed and pesticide costs) is assumed to be
proportional to crop production (i.e. a limitation production relationship). Proportionality to
crop output is also assumed for phosphate and kali fertilizer since they under Danish farming
conditions usually are applied so to insure an ample stock of nutrients for growing crops (i.e.
the nutrient restricting crop yield is normally nitrogen). The cost of heating stalls, along with
capital and labour are treated as an input to producing pig stall capacity (and therefore
assumed independent of the actual number of pigs produced). Whereas veterinary costs and
the cost of piglets for fattening pigs is assumed proportional to output. Thus, only feed and
nitrogen fertilizer inputs enter into a complex production relationship with output.
This specification seems a reasonable simplification while retaining flexible
estimation of behaviour with respect to key nitrogen flows. In addition, the specification
allows us to utilise more reliable data on intermediate inputs (cultivated land area and number
of pigsties) instead of capital accounts and self-reported labour inputs. We do, however,
estimate alternative specifications in order to test the assumed production structure.
 
4. The Data   
Estimations are based on a panel data set provided by the Danish Agricultural Advisory
Centre (Landbrugets Rådgivningscenter). The panel contains annual data, and is unbalanced
covering twelve growing seasons (1980 to 1991) with, on average, 1350 farms represented
each year with each farm participating for an average of 3.9 years. Data are sampled from
detailed gross margin accounts through a voluntary programme where only a small proportion
of the more business oriented farmers participate. On the one hand, voluntary participation is
an advantage in that participating farmers a priori are motivated and have an incentive to
provide data of high quality. On the other hand, the sample of farmers in the data set is not
representative of the population of Danish farmers.
For this analysis two groups of specialized pig farms were selected. The criteria for
selection was that the farmer had no cattle, that at least 20% of gross revenue originated from
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pig production and that pig production is specialized (i.e. either  piglets or fattening pigs are
produced, but not both). Specialised pig farms comprise about half of all pig farms and about
10% of all farms in the data set.    
For each farm the data include detailed annual accounts of variable costs, along with
corresponding accounts of quantitative flows of most nitrogen relevant inputs and outputs
(e.g. fertilizer, feed, crop yield, meat production, etc.). This allows an analysis of production
and calculation of input and output prices at the farm level for most nitrogen relevant inputs
and outputs. Coefficients indicating average nitrogen content of different inputs and outputs
have been added enabling us to calculate annual farm level mass balances for nitrogen and
residual nitrogen loss.
Prices for pig output and nitrogen input were calculated directly for each farmer as
income (net of proportional input costs) and costs respectively, divided by volume. Using a
common base observation (containing all feed and crop types) Fisher price indexes for crops
and feed were constructed based on each individual farmer's price. These were again
calculated as income (net of proportional input costs) and costs respectively divided by
volume. Thus prices for all inputs and outputs vary across farms as well as over time. Mean
values of the price index are reported in Table 1.   
Table 1 Means of farm specific price index for specialized pig farms
                Piglet producers           Fattening pig producers
Year Pigs Crops Feed N-ferti-
lizer
Pigs Crops Feed N-ferti-
lizer
1980 0.78 0.83 0.56 0.65 0.91 0.86 0.54 0.74
1981 0.79 0.90 0.63 0.82 No observations
1982 0.97 1.02 0.72 0.95 1.20 1.02 0.79 0.93
1983 1.07 1.11 0.77 1.17 1.20 1.13 0.88 1.17
1984 1.03 1.19 0.83 1.23 1.29 1.21 0.96 1.23
1985 1.25 1.10 0.84 1.39 1.29 1.12 0.90 1.38
1986 1.00 1.05 0.73 1.25 1.11 1.08 0.82 1.21
1987 0.97 0.97 0.71 0.93 1.08 0.98 0.75 0.94
1988 0.98 0.97 0.68 0.96 1.12 0.97 0.76 0.92
1989 1.20 1.02 0.69 0.98 1.26 1.03 0.79 0.99
1990 1.06 0.91 0.62 1.01 1.06 0.93 0.70 1.00
1991 1.15 0.86 0.62 1.13 1.20 0.90 0.65 1.13
All indexes exhibit substantial variation over the data period though no trend is apparent.
Mean values for the two data sets of key production variables and environmental
indicators are shown in Table 2. As noted, applied nitrogen fertilizer volume is registered in
farm accounts while nitrogen loss is calculated using registered volumes and standard
(average) nitrogen coefficients. 
 
14 The trans-log profit function resembles the trans-log cost function in that functio-
nal form and parameters are identical. However instead of dependant variables being
positively signed cost shares (that sum to 1) the profit function has profit shares as the
dependants that represent both costs of inputs and income from outputs. Corresponding to this
the underlying cost minimisation assumption has been replaced by a profit maximisation
assumption.  The profit shares also sum to 1 but while income from outputs (measured as a
proportion of profit) are positively signed costs of inputs (measured as a proportion of profit)
are negatively signed. The sum of positively signed profit shares from income is typically
greater than 1 so that when negatively signed profit shares from costs are added the resulting
profit is (by definition) equal to 1. Se e.g Chambers (1988) for the basics and e.g. Fontein et
al. (1994) for an application.    
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Table 2 Means of production and emission variables for specialized pig farms
      Piglet producers Fattening pig producers
Profit share* - Pigs  
 1.47 1.81
Profit share* - Crops 
 0.37 0.51
Profit share* - Feed 
-0.82 -1.30 
Profit share* - N-fertilizer 
-0.02 -0.02 
Pig stall capacity 
  126.7 sow stalls   717.6 pig stalls
Cultivated area
   38.4 hectares    53.9 hectares
Applied nitrogen fertilizer
  118.6 kg/hectare   114.1 kg/hectare
Nitrogen loss
  263.8 kg/hectare   255.1 kg/hectare  
Number of farms 220 220
Number of observations 610 676
* When calculating profit shares income from outputs (positively signed) and costs from inputs
(negatively signed) are measured as proportions of profit. Thus the sum of positively signed
shares is greater than 1 so that when negatively signed profit shares originating from costs
are added the resulting profit is by definition 1.  
While pig production is the main revenue generator, crop production is an important income
source for both groups (i.e. Danish pig farms are less specialised than e.g Dutch pig farms).
The sizable cultivated area (by European standards) on Danish pig farms also explains why a
substantial amount of chemical nitrogen fertilizer is applied to fields in addition to manure
and why N-loss per area is relatively low by  European standards (see Brouwer et al. (1995)
for a useful cross country comparison). 
5. Estimation 
Separate models were estimated for each of the two groups of farmers. The profit function
was assumed to have the trans-log14 functional form with the following specification:
13
ln(πn,t)'an%j4
i'1
ln(pi,n,t)bi,n % j6
i'5
ln(zi,n,t)bi,n %
½j4
i'1
j4
j'1
ln(pi,n,t)ci,j ln(pj,n,t) % ½j6
i'5
j6
j'5
ln(zi,n,t)ci,j ln(zj,n,t) %
½j4
i'1
j6
j'5
ln(pi,n,t)ci,j ln(zj,n,t) % ½j6
i'5
j4
j'1
ln(zi,n,t)ci,j ln(pj,n,t)
(12)
si,n,t ' bi,n % j4
j'1
ci,j ln(pj,n,t) % j6
j'5
ci,j ln(zj,n,t) (13)
yielding derived profit share equations for i=1,...,4 of the following form: 
where i and j subscripts indicate input/output types, n is a farm index and t indicates the time
period and si,n,t is the profit share of input/output i (defined as ). This is a quitesi,n,t '
pi,n,txi,n,t
πn,t
flexible model with fixed effects in each budget share equation as well as in the profit
equation. Thus, the model allows for substantial heterogeneity with five firm specific
parameters for each farm.  
The complete system was estimated in two steps. First the system of derived profit
share equations (without the profit function) was estimated using an iterated SUR procedure
(corresponding to maximum likelihood estimation). Restricting the parameters to ensure 
symmetry and homogeneity in prices and fixed inputs (implying   and j4
i'1
bi,n ' 1 j6
i'5
bi,n ' 1
for all n, ,  for all j and  for all i,j ) we eliminate the feedj4
j'1
ci,j ' 0 j6
j'5
ci,j ' 0 ci,j ' cj,i
equation (S3) to avoid singularity (the maximum likelihood procedure ensures that estimates
are invariant as to which equation is eliminated). Technically ci,j for i = 1,..,4 and j = 1,..,6 in
(13) are estimated using within farm transformed variables, eliminating time invariant
constants bi,n , which are then estimated as for allbˆi,n ' s¯i,n,t & j4
j'1
cˆi,j ln¯(pj,n,t) & j6
j'5
cˆi,j ln¯(zj,n,t)
n and i = 1,..,4, where -- indicates the mean of the variable over the time periods that farm n
participates in the panel. Results of this estimation are reported in Tables 3 and 4 (unique
parameters for the feed equation were calculated residually as indicated).
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Table 3 Common parameters estimated in the first step
                Piglet producers           Fattening pig producers
Para-
meter
Estimate Approx
Std Err
Approx
Prob 
Estimate Approx
Std Err
Approx
Prob 
c11
c12
c13
c14
c15
c16
c22
c23
c24
c25
c26
c33*
c34
c35*
c36*
c44
c45
c46
-0.3742
-0.2334
 0.5854
 0.0223
-0.4119
 0.4119
 0.3070
-0.0663
-0.0072
 0.1661
-0.1661
-0.5170
-0.0019
 0.2501
-0.2501
-0.0130
-0.0042
 0.0042
0.0593
0.0239
0.0521
0.0029
0.0380
0.0380
0.0294
0.0242
0.0034
0.0139
0.0139
 
0.0029
 
 
0.0021
0.0016
0.0016
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0064
0.0329
0.0001
0.0001
 
0.5050
 
 
0.0001
0.0093
0.0093
-0.3411
-0.4212
 0.7354
 0.0269
-0.2186
 0.2186
 0.3951
 0.0236
 0.0024
 0.0216
-0.0216
-0.7433
-0.0157
 0.1963
-0.1963
-0.0136
 0.0006
-0.0006
0.1198
0.0322
0.1099
0.0046
0.0678
0.0678
0.0356
0.0267
0.0053
0.0145
0.0145
 
0.0040
 
 
0.0026
0.0021
0.0021
0.0046
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0013
0.0013
0.0001
0.3768
0.6522
0.1366
0.1366
 
0.0001
 
 
0.0001
0.7763
0.7763
Eq   DF     R2within    R
2      
 
 S1  387  0.1769    0.7980   
S2  387  0.2891    0.8492  
S4  387  0.1133    0.7439  
      Correlation of Residuals      
  
    S1      S2      S4
S1   1.000  -0.362  -0.242
S2  -0.362   1.000  -0.284
 S4  -0.242  -0.284   1.000 
Eq   DF     R2within    R
2     
 S1   453   0.0305   0.8241
 S2   453   0.2052   0.8499
 S4   453   0.0821   0.6670
        Correlation of Residuals       
    S1      S2      S4
S1   1.000  -0.346  -0.164
S2  -0.346   1.000  -0.331
S4  -0.164  -0.331   1.000
Note: * indicates residual calculation using model restrictions.
In Table 3 we present common parameters as well as key regression statistics and the
residuals' correlation matrix for the estimated system, and Table 4 contains the mean, median
and standard deviation of the distribution of residually calculated farm specific fixed effects.
15  Estimating the complete system, including the profit function, with fixed effects
requires explicit representation of all fixed effects for each farm (as dummy variables) and
twas not feasible. The alternative of specifying the five farm specific parameters (an , bi,n for i
= 1,..4 ) as random effects was not attempted. The assumption of independence of individual
effects and explanatory variables necessary for the random effects specification to be valid is
not likely to hold.  
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ln(πn,t) & j4
i'1
ln(pi,n,t)bˆi,n & ½j4
i'1
j4
j'1
ln(pi,n,t) cˆi,j ln(pj,n,t) &j4
i'1
j6
j'5
ln(pi,n,t) cˆi,j ln(zj,n,t) '
an % j6
i'5
ln(zi,n,t)bi,n % ½j6
i'5
j6
j'5
ln(zi,n,t)ci,j ln(zj,n,t)
(14)
Table 4 Farm specific fixed effects estimated in the first step
                Piglet producers           Fattening pig producers
Para-
meter
Mean of
Estimates
Median of
Estimates
Std. Dev. of
Estimates
Mean of
Estimates
Median of
Estimates
Std. Dev. of
Estimates
b1,n
b2,n
b3,n*
b4,n
 1.1656
 0.5600
-0.6989
-0.0268
 1.1355
 0.5622
-0.6718
-0.0257
 0.2331
 0.0865
 0.2361
 0.0111
 1.4843
 0.6283
-1.0828
-0.0299
 1.3736
 0.6293
-0.9786
-0.0272
 0.6272
 0.1466
 0.5381
 0.0140
Note: * indicates residual calculation using model restrictions.
Fixed effects are highly significant in all derived equations. The common parameters are also
highly significant in most cases. Estimated share equations are consistent with monotonicity
and convexity. Inspection of error correlation matrices did not reveal serious serial correlation
in any of the equations. Statistical tests showed error distributions significantly different from
the normal distribution for all equations though residual plots indicated that deviations are not
substantial.  Residual plots for all equations in both data sets showed signs of heteroscedastic
error terms most clearly in equation S4. Though non-normality and heteroscedasticity may
invalidate inference tests, parameter estimates are still unbiased.
In the second step, the remaining parameters of the profit function were estimated
treating fixed effects and parameters estimated in the derived system as known, i.e. :
If the parameters estimated in the first step are unbiased, this will also be the case for
parameters estimated in the second step, however, the procedure may generate hetero-
scedasticity and invalidate the usual inference statistics15. Results of the second estimation
step are reported in Table 5.
    
16 With one exception: mean own price elasticity of fattening pig fertilizer is positive
due to a small number of relatively large positive elasticity observation. The median of this
own price is negative as are 78% of the single observations.    
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Table 5 Parameters estimated in the second step  
                Piglet producers           Fattening pig producers
Paramet
er
Estimate Approx
Std Err*
Approx
Prob* 
Estimate Approx
Std Err*
Approx
Prob* 
b5
b6
c55
c56
c66
  0.5641    0.0398   0.0001
   0.4358    0.0398   0.0001
  -0.1853    0.1431   0.1957
   0.1853    0.1431   0.1957
  -0.1853    0.1431   0.1957
  0.6489     0.0450    0.0001
  0.3510     0.0450    0.0001
 -0.1285     0.0565    0.0235
  0.1285     0.0565    0.0235
 -0.1285     0.0565    0.0235
Mean of
Estimates
Median of
Estimates
Std. Dev.
of
Estimates
Mean of
Estimates
Median of
Estimates
Std. Dev.
of
Estimates
an 8.9408      8.9430    0.4098  8.2365        8.2847        0.4941 
DF      R2within         R
2  
 
388      0.3698     0.9135 
  DF      R2within        R
2     
   454     0.1075      0.8790  
      
Note: * inference statistics conditional on known first step parameters, i.e. a lower bound for
true standard errors. 
    
Error correlation matrices and residual plots for the second step estimation did not indicate 
serious serial correlation or heteroscedasticity whereas significant (but not serious) non-
normality was detected.
All estimated own price elasticities have the expected signs (consistent with profit
maximisation) in mean and median16 and depending on the own price elasticity this also holds
for  61%-99% of all single observations in the fattening pig data set and for 77%-100% of all
single observations in the piglet producer data set (see appendix). Cross-price elasticities of
outputs with corresponding variable inputs (i.e. pigs with feed and crops with fertilizer) all
have the expected signs in mean and median and depending on the price elasticity for  88% -
100% of individual observations in the two data sets. In both data sets, shadow rents for fixed
inputs are positive in mean and median as are all single observations of rents of cultivated
land while pig stall rents are positive for 98% of the piglet producer observations and 87% of
the fattening pig producer observations. As one would expect the mean/median shadow rent
of land is almost the same in the two data sets and as expected the shadow rent for a sow stall
is substantially larger than for a fattening pigsty. Shadow rents also have plausible orders of
magnitude when compared with market prices of land and building costs of sties.  
One peculiarity seems notable. Both of the estimated models have a relatively large
positive cross price elasticities between the two outputs. This may be explained by e.g. the
fertilizer effect of pig manure. We have, nevertheless, estimated alternative models with
parameter restrictions (on c1,2) ensuring moderate cross price elasticities. These and a number
of other alternative specifications where the homogeneity assumption for fixed inputs is
dropped and where trend and labour input variables are included as fixed inputs, are presented
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si % cii /si & 1 (15)
si % cii /si & 1 & s6 % ci6 /si
si % ci6 /s6
s6 % c66 /s6 & 1
(16)
s6 ' b6 % j4
j'1
cj6 ln(pj) % j6
j'5
cj6 ln(zj) (17)
in the appendix. Price elasticities are not affected dramatically by these specification changes
whereas shadow rents of fixed inputs are - in some cases becoming wrongly signed or having
implausible/inconsistent orders of magnitude.    
In conclusion, the estimated model performs well statistically and own and cross-price
elasticities have the correct signs, plausible magnitudes and are robust to plausible
specification changes. Shadow rents of fixed inputs on the other hand, are highly dependent
on the assumed specification but attain more plausible values with the model presented than
with alternative specifications.
6. Results
In Table 6 short and long run own price elasticities  for each farm type are reported.
In the short run fixed inputs are held constant so that elasticities for goods i = 1,..,4 are
given by the usual trans-log formula:
   
When calculating long-run elasticities, a choice must be made about which fixed inputs are
allowed to adjust and whether the costs of fixed inputs are affected by this adjustment. 
When considering marginal investments in pig stall capacity, it seems reasonable to
assume elastic supply functions for producers of the relevant buildings and equipment, so that
the price of pig stall capacity can be assumed not to change.
This is not the case for land.  Aggregate land supply available for farming is highly
inelastic. This means that the ceteris paribus assumption will not hold for land prices when
analysing a change in the price of a variable input/output that affects all farmers. Land prices
will adjust so as to neutralise the initial change in aggregate land demand. Thus holding land
input constant when calculating long-run elasticities may, off hand, seem a reasonable choice.
However, changes in input/output prices will probably affect pig-producing and non-pig-
producing farmers differently so that some reallocation of aggregate land input between the
two farm groups is probable. 
Modelling land market price reactions is beyond the scope of this paper and we
therefore assume constant land input and full pig stall adjustment when calculating long run
elasticities. Under these assumptions the long run elasticity for goods i = 1,..,4 becomes (see
appendix for the derivation):
where s6 is defined corresponding to the profit share equations (13): 
The reported long run elasticities should be interpreted in the light of these assumptions. It
should also be stressed that while our short run elasticities are robust to model specification
changes, our long run elasticities depend critically on parameters that are not robust to
plausible specification changes.
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Table 6 Own price input demand and output supply elasticities 
      Piglet producers Fattening pig producers
  Short run                  Long run       Short run               Long run   
Pig output  0.27             1.42 0.62            1.02
Crop output 0.19             0.22 0.27            0.28
Feed input
-1.28            -1.98 -1.75           -2.12 
N-fertilizer input
-0.38            -0.38 -0.45           -0.45 
Note: calculated for the 1987 median observation which generates elasticities close to the
corresponding medians over all observations. 
In their study of Dutch pig farms, Fontein et al. (1994) report feed own price elasticities of 
-3.2 for fattening pigs and -2.8 for piglets when N-loss is allowed to adjust while other fixed
inputs are held constant (elasticities for output are not reported). It is not clear whether these
should be compared with our short run or long run elasticities. In addition to this paper we are
aware of two studies of pig production generating comparable results. Hallam and Zanoli
(1993) estimate an error correction model for UK piglet production using aggregate time
series data finding a  short-run own price elasticity of 0.16 for piglet output. Kuiper and
Meulenberg (1997) use the Johansen co-integration method on aggregate time series for
Dutch fattening pigs finding a long run own price elasticity of 3.37. While short run
elasticities derived from aggregate data probably can be compared with those derived from
micro studies, long run elasticities from aggregate studies include the effects of farm entry-
exit and land adjustment that are held constant in our study. Given this, methodological
differences and the substantial structural differences between pig farms of the different
countries our results seem consistent with previous studies.
The results on which we focus here are the abatement costs of reducing nitrogen loss
under different tax schemes that can be derived from the estimated model. In table 7
abatement costs with a 10% reduction in nitrogen loss are reported for four tax schemes:
S A tax on nitrogen loss
S A tax on nitrogen content in input (feed as well as chemical fertilizer)
S A tax on nitrogen content in feed, and
S A tax on nitrogen content in chemical fertilizer.
Abatement costs and N-loss reductions in the short-run adjustment column are calculated
according to (5) and (6) respectively. Long-run abatement costs and reductions are calculated
under the same assumption as the reported long-run elasticities (fixed land input and full pig
stall adjustment) according to (10) and (11) respectively, where the long run adjustment in pig
stall capacity (z6 ) is found numerically by iterating equation (9). The difference between the
two columns is the extra cost of insisting on quick achievement of the reduction goal. 
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Table 7 Average abatement costs (DKK per kilo N-loss reduction) when N-loss is
reduced by 10%
      Piglet Producers Fattening pig producers
Incentive scheme: 10% reduction  
after short-run
adjustment   
10% reduction  
after long-run
adjustment       
10% reduction  
after short-run
adjustment   
10% reduction  
after long-run
adjustment       
Tax on N-loss  0.87 0.66 0.77 0.72
Tax on all input 0.87 0.66 0.78 0.74
Tax on feed 1.5 0.98 1.44 1.27
Tax on N-
fertilizer  
1.62 1.51 1.5 1.35
Note: calculated for the 1987 median observation. 
By design the N-loss tax generates incentives that minimize abatement costs. As expected
both a fertilizer tax and a feed tax distort incentives and generate substantial increases in
abatement costs (with the fertilizer tax generally doubling abatement costs while the cost
increase of a feed tax is somewhat smaller). The input tax, on the other hand, only implies a
very small increase in abatement costs compared to the N-loss tax.
Efficiency of the N-loss tax is consistent with the theoretical result of Holtermann
(1976) which is built in to our empirical model. The real news here is that the input tax is
almost as efficient as the N-loss tax while both the fertilizer and feed taxes are substantially
more costly. Part of the reason for this is the larger elasticities for inputs then for outputs seen
in table 6. However, the main explanation is that nitrogen content per kroner value is
substantially larger for inputs then for outputs. Thus a uniform rate tax/subsidy implies
substantially smaller relative (per cent) effects on output prices then on input prices. Since the
input tax (relative to the efficient N-loss tax) only distorts prices on the output side the
resulting efficiency loss is small. On the other hand both the fertilizer and the feed tax also
imply distortion of input prices resulting in a substantially larger efficiency loss.
        Calculations have also been carried out for price/fixed input combinations spanning
the variations of observations in the two data sets and for alternative model specifications.
Though the absolute magnitude of abatement costs varies substantially in all cases, we find
the same pattern of abatement cost ratios, i.e. substantially higher abatement costs for the feed
and fertilizer tax and only marginal increases for the input tax. Specifically, irrespective of
farm type and time horizon,  we found that in no case did the abatement cost increase, implied
by the input tax, exceed 3% of the Pigouvian cost level.       
      
7. Conclusions 
Using panel data we have estimated flexible form profit functions and nitrogen loss
for Danish piglet and fattening pig producers with several farm specific effects. The resulting
system emits plausible short run price elasticities that are robust to model specification
changes and consistent with other studies. Using a shadow price appraisal of fixed input costs
we are able to derive long run elasticities. These also seem plausible and are consistent with
other studies, but depend critically on parameters that are not robust to plausible model
specification changes.
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The main result of this study is the quantification of abatement costs for reducing
nitrogen loss under different tax systems. We compare four tax systems: a tax on nitrogen
loss, a tax on nitrogen in all input, a tax on nitrogen in feed and a tax on nitrogen in chemical
fertilizer. By design the N-loss tax generates Pigouvian incentives that minimize abatement
costs. As expected both a fertilizer tax and a feed tax distort incentives and generate
substantial increases in abatement costs. The input tax, on the other hand, only  implies a
marginal increase in abatement costs.
This is interesting because an input tax is easier to implement than an N-loss tax. Our
result implies that even a limited administrative cost advantage would make the input tax
preferable to implementing Pigouvian incentives through an N-loss tax.  
It should be stressed, however, that the estimated model is based on aggregated crop
output and feed input and so does not capture the effects of incentives to substitute within
these aggregates. Taking account of these effects will tend to increase the abatement cost
advantage of Pigouvian incentives. In addition, the model only covers pig farms. Since the
abatement cost pattern of dairy and crop farms may differ our results do not necessarily apply
to the Danish agricultural sector as a whole. Further since our data are the result of a
voluntary program the sample of pig farms used here may not be fully representative of the
entire population of Danish pig farmers. 
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Appendix
Table A: Price elasticities of model 
Price elasticities for variable inputs and outputs and shadow rents for fixed inputs are
calculated for expected input/output levels for each data observation. The mean and median
of the distribution of elasticities/rents and the proportion of positive elasticities/rents are
reported for all input/output price combinations.     
Input/
output                 Piglet producers
                Prices 
      Fattening pig producers 
               Prices 
x1
Mean  
median 
%>0  
x2
Mean  
median 
%>0   
x3
Mean  
median 
%>0   
x4
Mean  
median 
%>0   
     p1     p2       p3       p4  
  
   0.20    0.21   -0.41   -0.005
   0.19    0.20   -0.39   -0.004
     73%     95%     11%     38%
                      
   0.68    0.42   -1.05   -0.046
   0.73    0.22   -0.99   -0.043
    95%     99%      0%      0%
  
                       
   0.68    0.46   -1.13   -0.019
   0.71    0.44   -1.15   -0.017
    88%     99%      2%      2%
 
                        
  -0.22    0.93   -0.68   -0.033
   0.24    0.79   -0.67   -0.349
      62%     99%      1%     27%   
           shadow rents
              Dkk/hectare  Dkk/stall
   Mean       13447.99    1668.70 
  median      11181.28    1246.02 
    %>0         100%        98%   
      p1     p2       p3       p4  
    0.60   0.255   -0.85   -0.008
    0.50   0.259   -0.76   -0.005
     79%     97%      7%     33%
 
    0.82   0.441   -1.25   -0.019
    0.80   0.282   -1.14   -0.016
     97%    100%      0%      7%
 
    1.15   0.495   -1.64   -0.010
    1.08   0.511   -1.56   -0.008
     92%    100%      0%     25%
 
   -0.72   0.289    0.18    0.256
    0.41   0.404   -0.45   -0.382
       67%     93%     25%     22%   
         shadow rents
          Dkk/hectare  Dkk/stall
  Mean      11786.40    152.65 
 median     10356.85     77.45 
  %>0         100%        87%  
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Table B: Own price elasticities and shadow rents of model and alternative specifications
Own price elasticities for variable inputs and outputs and shadow rents for fixed inputs are
calculated for expected input/output levels for each data observation. The mean and median
of the distribution of elasticities/rents and the proportion of positive elasticities/rents are
reported for all own prices and shadow rents.     
Input/
output                 Piglet producers       Fattening pig producers 
Price elast:
x1
Mean  
median 
%>0  
x2
Mean  
median 
%>0   
x3
Mean  
median 
%>0   
x4
Mean  
median 
%>0   
shadow rents:
Dkk/hectare
Mean  
median 
%>0   
Dkk/stall 
Mean  
median 
%>0   
Dkk/workyear 
Mean  
median 
%>0   
Base   Alt1   Alt2   Alt3   Alt4 
  
  0.20   0.26   0.28   0.21   0.28   
  0.19   0.23   0.26   0.19   0.26   
   73%    78%    79%    74%    80%   
         
                      
  0.42   0.45   0.30   0.38   0.68   
  0.22   0.24   0.13   0.19   0.41   
   99%    99%    99%    99%   100%   
            
                       
 -1.13  -1.18  -1.26  -1.14  -1.12   
 -1.15  -1.20  -1.28  -1.16  -1.13   
    2%     2%     1%     3%     3%   
               
                        
 -0.03  -0.02   0.17   0.10   0.00   
 -0.35  -0.35  -0.24  -0.29  -0.35   
   27%    26%    34%    32%    28%   
         
 
 13447 -157564  2505  10971  13561   
 11181 -135914  2695   9346  11253   
  100%     0%    95%   100%   100%   
   
  1668  -15067  4071   2152   1646   
  1246  -12478  3859   1802   1218   
  98%     1%   100%   100%    98%  
  
   .       .      . 107579       .
   .       .      .  98806       .
   .       .      .    96%       .
 Base   Alt1   Alt2   Alt3   Alt4  
  0.60   0.65   0.72   0.59   0.78   
  0.50   0.54   0.62   0.50   0.66   
   79%    84%    88%    88%    93%   
               
 
  0.44   0.46   0.42   0.44   0.80   
  0.28   0.29   0.26   0.28   0.54   
  100%    97%   100%   100%   100%   
               
 -1.64  -1.68  -1.78  -1.63  -1.69   
 -1.56  -1.60  -1.72  -1.56  -1.61   
    0%     1%     0%     1%     0%   
                                     
  0.26  -0.44   0.44  -0.11  -0.74   
 -0.38  -0.35  -0.21  -0.34  -0.39   
   22%    24%    37%    24%    22%   
                      
 11786 -153443  9646   8652  11781   
 10356 -140796  8317   7927  10354   
  100%      0%  100%    99%   100%   
        
   152   -4490   359    396    153   
    77   -3809   226    272     78   
   87%      0%   93%    93%    87%   
             
   .      .     .    989269   . 
   .      .     .    905529   . 
   .      .     .      100%   . 
Note: Alt1 is the base model without homogeneity restrictions on fixed inputs. 
Alt2 is the base model with a time trend added as a fixed input.  
Alt3 is the base model with a variable indicating labour use added as a fixed input. 
Alt4 is the base model with c1,2 restricted to reduce output cross price elasticities
23
dxi
dpi
pi
xi
' δxi
δpi
% δxi
δz6
dz6
dpi
pi
xi
'
δxi
δpi
pi
xi
% δxi
δz6
z6
xi
dz6
dpi
pi
z6
(i)
pˆ 06 '
π(pi,z6) s6(pi,z6)
z6
(ii)
F(pi,z6) '
π(pi,z6) s6(pi,z6)
z6
& pˆ 06 (ii)
dz6
dpi
' &
dF
dpi
dF
dz6
' &
π
z6
c6,i
pi
% s6
z6
dπ
dpi
π
z6
c6,6
z6
% s6
z6
dπ
dz6
& π s6
(z6)
2
(iii)
dz6
dpi
pi
z6
' & si % ci6 /s6
s6 % c66 /s6 & 1
(iv)
Derivation of long run own price elasticity when one fixed input adjusts
Generally the long-run elasticity of input i can be decomposed as follows: 
The first parenthesis is the short run price elasticity while the second is input i 's elasticity
with respect to the fixed input. For the trans-log specification these are    and(si % cii /si & 1)
 respectively. In the third parenthesis (dz6 /dpi) is given by the assumption that the(s6 % ci6 /si)
fixed input is adjusted so as to hold its shadow rent constant i.e. (dz6 /dpi) is given by equation
(9) that for the trans-log specification (when variables that are held constant are dropped from
the functional expressions) is:
  
Defining
 
we find the derivative by implicit differentiation i.e.:
which after multiplying by pi /z6 and inserting  and  reduces so that:
dπ
dpi
' π
pi
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